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Regulatory agencies are unwilling or unable to close thrift institutions 
immediately upon insolvency.  Instead, they have progressively reduced the 
thrift capital requirement,  refrained from enforcing that requirement,  and 
allowed thrifts to hold more nonmortgage loans in the hope that the industry 
would recover.  According to this study,  only 13 percent of the largest 300 
firms eventually recovered between the end of 1979 and the end of 1989.  When 
the thrift crisis surfaced in the early 1980s,  the firms that ultimately 
recovered operated in a fashion similar to those that eventually failed.  But 
in the mid-1980s,  recovered thrifts pursued a risk-minimizing  strategy,  while 
nonrecovered thrifts pursued a risky,  high-growth  strategy.  We find no 
evidence that managers of unsuccessful firms consumed more perquisites than 
their successful counterparts. 
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Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s,  the thrift industry (savings 
and loans [S&Ls] and mutual savings banks) was plagued by severe problems that 
led to massive numbers of insolvencies and bankrupted the government fund 
established to insure the industry  '  s deposits.  l  Public concern about the 
enormous cost of the cleanup, though certainly justified,  obscured an 
important fact:  Unlike industries that require insolvent institutions to 
renegotiate with creditors immediately or under Chapter 11  protection (see 
Gilson et al. [1991]),  thrifts often operate in an insolvent condition for 
extended periods.  Although most undercapitalized thrifts remain weak or 
eventually fail,  some do successfully rebuild their capital ratios to levels 
exceeding the regulatory minimum.  This study investigates the restructuring 
strategies adopted by these recovered institutions and compares them to the 
operating strategies of thrifts that failed. 
Although many factors contributed to the thrift industry's demise, two 
are generally considered most important: interest-rate risk and credit risk. 
The industry's policy of funding long-term  loans (principally mortgages) with 
short-term  financing (principally deposits) makes it vulnerable to unexpected 
Ely (1989) reports that as of June 30,  1989,  538 thrifts were insolvent, 
while taxpayer losses stemming from failure of the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) are projected to be in the hundreds of billions 
of dollars.  Pauley (1989) estimates the cost of disposing of approximately 
500 insolvent institutions as $124 billion at mid-year  1989.  Other estimates 
range from $50  billion (Barth et al. [1990]) to as much as $150 billion (Kane 
[1989]).  Benston and Kaufman (1990) point out that the $115 billion provided 
by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,  and Enforcement Act is 50 
times larger than the cost of the celebrated bailout of New York City in 1975 
and 80 times larger than the cost of the Chrysler rescue in 1979. 
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three years later,  according to a 1987 U.S.  General Accounting Office (GAO) 
report,  unexpected rate increases had inflicted large capital losses on 
thrifts having negative duration gaps.  For many of these firms,  however, the 
losses were largely offset by the unexpected decrease in rates (and the lower 
volatilities of those rates) later in the year. 
Although interest-rate risk was the major source of thrifts' losses in 
the first half of the 1980s,  credit risk became the dominant factor behind the 
industry's woes during the second half of the decade.  By 1987,  the 
deteriorating quality of assets in thrift portfolios, particularly real estate 
investments in the Southwest,  accounted for virtually all of the industry's 
remaining problems. 
From the late 1970s through mid-1989,  regulators,  gambling that 
unexpectedly lower interest rates would restore thrift institutions to health, 
progressed through several stages in their attempts to resolve the crisis. 
The required capital ratio was reduced from about 5 percent to virtually zero 
between 1980 and 1986,  and regulators even permitted a number of thrifts 
deemed insolvent under regulatory accounting principles (RAP) to continue 
to operate.  Despite the potential problems inherent in such a policy, this 
action gave the industry two important advantages:  First,  beginning in the 
early 1980s,  the policy granted thrifts expanded investment and lending powers 
with which to restructure their business strategies.  Second,  although many of 
these new powers were restricted by early 1985,  thrifts were given an extended 
period in which to rebuild their capital ratios. 
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incentive structure that the industry faced,  however.  The FSLIC continued to 
provide deposit insurance at rates independent of risk.  In  addition,  staffing 
reductions at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) meant fewer examiners 
and thus less-stringent monitoring.  Under these conditions, theory suggests 
that thrift managers will take larger risks,  even if the expected return is 
not commensurate with those risks.2  Therefore, it was not clear a priori 
that the industry would utilize its newfound advantages to retrench and 
restructure in an attempt to regain solvency.  Thrifts could have chosen to 
engage in risky operations that would have eroded their portfolio quality and 
endangered their recovery. 
Our study shows that almost all of the largest 300 thrifts posting 
capital deficiencies at the end of 1979 utilized the flexibility granted by 
the lower required capital ratio,  yet only 13 percent had recovered by the end 
of 1989.  In  contrast,  more than  half (55 percent) of the institutions  had 
failed or merged.  The remaining thrifts continued to operate,  but with less 
capital than required in 1979.  Even with continued regulatory forbearance,  we 
find no evidence that their condition improved. 
Unlike previous studies,  which examine differences between 
For example, see Buser et al. (1981),  Marcus (1984),  Ronn and Verma 
(1986), Flannery (1991),  and Keeley (1990).  John et al. (1991) and Ritchken 
et al. (1991)  illustrate the importance of frequent monitoring. 
See,  for example, Benston (1985), Barth and Bradley (1989),  Barth et al. 
(1990),  Cole et al. (1991),  and Kane (1989). 
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insolvent firms that recover and those that do not.  Three conclusions emerge: 
First',  our evidence suggests that identifying  which firms will eventually 
recover would at best be very difficult.  Combining our results with those of 
the earlier studies,  we find that although it is relatively easy to 
distinguish undercapitalized thrifts from safe ones,  pinpointing which of the 
zombie institutions  will ultimately recover may not be possible using only 
financial data.  Second,  differential use of the new investment policies does 
not distinguish recovered firms from failed institutions.  However, 
unsuccessful firms do take on  more asset risk and tend to hold a riskier 
deposit pool,  which jeopardizes their portfolio quality and their recovery. 
Finally,  we find no evidence that nonrecovered thrifts consume more perks than 
their more successful counterparts.  This implies that managers of failed 
firms are no more susceptible to principal-agent  problems than managers of 
successful ones;  rather,  they may simply be less fortunate or less adept at 
operating thrift institutions. 
2. Institutional Background and Hypotheses Testing 
2.1 The Rise and Fall of the S&L  Industry 
The National Housing Act of 1934 established the FSLIC and limited 
deposit insurance coverage to $5,000  per account.  This limit was 
progressively increased to $40,000  over the next 40  years and was then hiked 
to its current level of $100,000  by the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA).  Because customers can establish 
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funds across several insured institutions easy,  essentially all thrift 
deposits are federally insured.  Kormendi et al.  (1989) report that as of 
September 1988,  the FSLIC explicitly insured about $1.3 trillion in S&L 
deposits. 
The thrift industry's  traditional policy of funding long-term, 
fixed-rate  mortgages with short-term  deposits was generally profitable during 
the relatively tranquil period that preceded the mid-1960s.  Although this 
strategy made thrifts vulnerable to unexpected increases in interest rates, 
such upticks were,  until then,  historically unlikely.  The solvency crisis of 
the 1960s was followed by more severe losses in the late 1970s,  when rapid 
inflation led to unexpectedly higher interest rates.  By 1982,  short-funded 
institutions were experiencing huge capital losses that drove many into 
insolvency, since thrifts had traditionally operated with relatively low 
capital levels. 
The incentive effects of flat-rate  deposit insurance magnify both the 
potential and the realized problems connected with the factors listed 
above  .4  Merton (1977) models insurance as a put option, and it is well 
known that the value of options increases with volatility.  Thus,  although 
insurance is worth more to riskier thrifts,  flat-rate  pricing means that they 
pay no more for it than other institutions.  Kane (1985) and Kormendi et al. 
(1989) argue that this incentive is particularly powerful for insolvent or 
Emerson (1934) identified certain of these problems within a year after 
the Glass-Steagall  Act of 1933 instituted deposit insurance. 
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example,  Brewer  (1990)  finds that risky thrifts that adopted still riskier 
strategies obtained higher stock returns than lower-risk thrifts that pursued 
similar strategies.  This result is consistent with the notion that owners  of 
thinly capitalized firms would  rather place  the insurer's capital at risk than 
their own.  By  1987,  interest-rate-related capital losses had been mostly 
eliminated or restored, but the credit quality of  thrift assets had 
deteriorated dramatically,  accounting for virtually all  of  the industry's 
remaining problems. 
In principle, an insurer can protect itself by  charging sufficiently 
high premiums  and by  taking steps to reduce  its loss exposure  (for instance, 
by  assigning staff members  to supervise those thrifts most  likely to take 
risks unacceptable to the insurer).  However,  as Kane  (1985)  and Kormendi  et 
al. (1989)  note, deposit insurance contracts do  not include any  of  the 
standard methods  to accomplish this, as there are no  provisions for 
deductibles, coinsurance,  or enforced limits on  coverage. 
The  incentive problems  associated with deposit  insurance are also 
magnified by  scarce regulatory resources.  Benston  and Kaufman  (1990),  among 
others, claim that the relatively small number  of  FSLIC  examiners  could not 
have  prevented the plethora of  financially distressed thrifts from  engaging in 
risky operations,  especially during the period examined here.  Fraud and 
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2.2 Resolution of the Crisis 
In the early 1980s,  most thrifts in financial straits suffered losses 
due to unanticipated increases in interest rates.  Policymakers,  reasoning 
that unexpectedly lower rates or more diversified assets would restore these 
institutions to health,  chose to forbear and took actions to cover up emerging 
problems in the industry.  Regulatory forbearance often took the form of 
capital augmentation, reductions in mandatory capital requirements,  and 
failure to enforce existing requirements.6  The government also allowed 
thrifts to invest in nontraditional assets such as nonmortgage loans and 
Perhaps themost amazingexampleofboth fraudandincompetenceisVernon 
Savings and Loan of Vernon, Texas.  By the time regulators closed Vernon in 
1987,  96 percent of its loans were in default.  Most of the remaining loans 
contained some form of deferred interest provision; they could not possibly 
have been in default because the first interest payments had not yet come due. 
Scott Taylor,  a former FSLIC deputy director of liquidations who saw more than 
50 institutions placed into receivership,  stated that "Those companies did not 
fail because of broader asset and investment  powers, or because of direct 
investments in real estate.  They failed because of fraud, incompetence and 
criminality ...."  See Benston (1985). 
The wisdom of permitting insolvent institutions to continue to operate 
has been challenged by Kane (1985,  1990), Kormendi et al. (1989),  and Benston 
and Kaufman (1990),  among others.  They argue that incentives to adopt risky 
business and investment strategies are greatest for insolvent firms. 
DeGennaro and Thomson (1990) estimate the cost of regulatory forbearance from 
1980 through 1989.  Although their preliminary evidence on the ex-post  cost of 
such forbearance is inconclusive,  it does document the massive dollar amount 
these regulatory gambles place at risk. 
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In  November 1980, the FHLBB both reduced thrifts' explicit capital 
requirement from approximately 5 percent to about 4  percent and provided for a 
"qualifying balance deduction" that in effect lowered the requirement still 
further.  Beginning in November 1981,  the FSLIC accepted net-worth 
certificates from thrifts with less than 3 percent net worth in exchange for 
FSLIC promissory notes,  with face value guaranteed by the insurer.  And 
in a departure from generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), the FSLIC 
permitted thrifts to count these certificates as part of capital.  In  January 
1982,  the capital requirement  was further reduced to 3 percent.  The following 
July, thrift regulators permitted goodwill (an intangible component of 
capital) to be amortized over a 40-year  period,  while allowing income from 
unbooked gains to be realized in as little as five years.  Furthermore, the 
FHLBB began to include "appraised  equity capital" in its calculations of 
regulatory net worth in November 1982.  8 
Beginning with DIDMCA in March 1980,  legislative and regulatory 
authorities began granting thrifts new investment powers.  DIDMCA,  for 
example, authorized federally chartered S&Ls  to invest up to 20 percent of 
their assets in corporate bonds and consumer loans and extended their 
authority to make construction or acquisition loans.  The Garn-St  Germain 
For a more-detailed  examination,  see Barth and Bradley (1989) and Kane 
(1989). 
Appraised equity capital is the difference between the appraised market 
value and the book value of certain assets. 
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mortgage and consumer loans still further. 
Even though interest rates had fallen substantially by 1985, the S&L 
industry remained troubled.  In  March 1985,  the FHLBB issued new 
regulations that limited the amount of direct investment thrifts could 
undertake and reinstituted higher capital standards (Kane [1989,  table 2-41). 
Later that year,  FHLBB Chairman Edwin Gray testified before Congress that both 
regulations were needed to protect the FSLIC fund from ever-increasing  credit 
risks.  However,  these actions were motivated in large part by the FHLBB's 
desire to maintain the S&L  industry's  "It's a Wonderful Life" image,  thus 
protecting its own regulatory turf and buying time to allow the industry to 
recover.  During the second half of the decade,  the FHLBB continued its policy 
of forbearance,  but rather than augmenting capital through accounting 
adjustments or reduced capital requirements,  regulators simply ignored the 
requirements after 1987.  10 
In  brief,  regulatory and legal action taken during the 1980s produced 
Kane (1990) reports that the interest-rate  decline was less helpful than 
it might have appeared because many mortgage borrowers exercised their option 
to refinance at the lower rates. 
lo  According to the GAO (1987,  pp. 3  and 8),  the FHLBB announced on February 
25,  1987 that "...the Bank Board is unlikely to take administrative action to 
enforce the minimum capital requirements for ...  basically sound,  well-managed 
thrifts with regulatory capital above 0.5  percent,  and with problems in the 
energy, agricultural,  natural resources or other distressed sectors [of] the 
economy."  In large part, the change in the forbearance rationale was borne of 
necessity.  Barth and Bradley (1989) report that the FSLIC lacked the reserves 
to close and resolve all of the insolvent thrift institutions. 
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thrifts with additional time to improve their business strategies and to 
regain solvency.  For example,  regulators gave troubled thrifts the 
opportunity to restructure their assets towards shorter-term  commercial or 
consumer loans,  which in turn allowed these firms to reduce their risk and to 
raise their asset quality.  But the FHLBB also scaled back regulatory 
supervision and left intact the risk-taking  incentive structure for insured 
thrifts.  Given these perverse incentives,  there could be no guarantee that 
regulatory forbearance and new investment powers would be profitably utilized 
rather than abused. 
2.3 Testable Hypotheses 
Our interest centers on whether the S&L  industry did in fact seize 
this opportunity to restructure itself.  During the additional operating time 
provided by regulatory forbearance,  did thrift managers effectively utilize 
their new powers?  If so,  we hypothesize that recovered institutions may have 
diversified their asset portfolios and restructured their liabilities in order 
to achieve a more effective funding mix.  However, less-frequent  monitoring, 
coupled with the perverse incentives inherent in flat-rate  deposit insurance, 
may have resulted in thrifts taking on  more asset and liability risk.  Our 
empirical evidence suggests that successful institutions took on less risk 
than those that failed,  a finding that is consistent with Cole et al. (1990), 
Benston (1985), Barth and Bradley (1989),  Barth et al. (1990),  and Kane 
(1989).  Given this,  we hypothesize that firms in financial distress at the 
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manage risk by switching to a less-risky portfolio, changing their funding 
mix, or increasing their capital to provide a cushion against losses. 
Clearly,  these options are not mutually exclusive. 
Another strategy distressed thrifts could have employed is based on 
the theoretical work of Merton (1977) and Marcus'(1984).  Modeling the equity 
of an insured banking firm as a call option, these studies show that the 
firm's equity value is a decreasing function of capital and an increasing 
function of portfolio risk.  Although this behavior is opposite that of the 
observed risk-minimizing  or risk-managing  strategies noted above, it may be an 
optimal strategy for undercapitalized firms.  In fact,  deterioration of the 
credit quality of thrift portfolios during the second half of the 1980s is 
likely a  consequence of this restructuring strategy. 
Our null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
HO:  Recovered thrifts pursued a different 
restructuring strategy than nonrecovered 
thrifts. 
H1:  Recovered thrifts pursued the same risky 
restructuring strategy as nonrecovered 
thrifts,  but were luckier. 
We also ask whether managers of failing firms consumed more perks. If not, 
then perhaps self-dealing by management was not a material factor in the 
industry's demise. 
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We obtained data from the FHLBB Thrift Financial Reports (call 
reports).  These reports,  which the FHLBB uses in off-site  examinations, 
contain financial information  on balance-sheet and income-statement items, as 
well as on items such as regulatory capital and rates paid on accounts.  The 
data pertain to FSLIC-insured  S&Ls  and mutual savings banks. 
Our sample period begins December 31,  1979 and extends through 
December 31,  1989.  Because the FHLBB required thrifts to file these reports 
semiannually through December 31,  1983 and quarterly thereafter, our sample 
covers 33 call reports.  To permit meaningful comparisons through time,  we 
semiannualize the data beginning in 1984,  resulting in 21 semiannual 
observations. 
We chose December 31,  1979 as our starting date for several reasons. 
First, 998 thrifts were unable to meet capital requirements at that time. 
Second, the date precedes the 1980 and 1982 legislative changes and the 
explicit adoption of forbearance policies by thrift regulators.  Third, it 
provides a full 10-year period to track the progress of thrifts in financial 
difficulty.  Finally,  December 31,  1979 marks the transition date from one 
call report format to another.  As one might expect, specific data items 
included in these reports evolve through time,  with substantial changes 
introduced periodically.  By beginning our sample immediately after such a 
change,  we minimize the number of variables lost. In a few cases,  we are able 
to reconstruct variables by combining others according to information 
contained in the Microdata Reference Manual  (see Board of Governors of the 
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important thrifts,  we selected the 300 largest firms having GAAP net 
worth/total asset ratios of less than 5  percent at the end of 1979.'' 
Table 1 gives the time profile of the sample.  Firms may disappear 
from the sample for any of several reasons.  First,  they may have failed and 
been closed by regulatory authorities.  Second,  regulators may have forced 
them to merge with other institutions.  Finally,  they may have been acquired 
by other firms without federal intervention.  Barth et al. (1990) claim that 
most thrift failures prior to 1983 resulted from unexpected interest-rate 
increases.  They further argue that 1983 and 1984  were characterized by 
relatively few failures and that most thrifts failing after 1985 did so 
because of poor asset quality.  The relative paucity of failed thrifts in the 
mid-1980s is somewhat  misleading,  because the number of surviving firms in our 
sample declines in each period.  This drop-off makes the large number of 
failures from January 1988 through 1989 still more substantial,  as it reflects 
more than 23 percent of the total number of firms in the sample at the 
beginning of 1988. 
4.  Empirical Evidence and Discussion 
The appropriate measure of thrift net worth depends on the intended 
use of the information.  When available,  market-based  measures are preferred, 
but because relatively few thrifts in our sample have publicly traded equity, 
******A***** 
The 5  percent selection criterion approximates the statutory capital 
requirement in force in  December 1979. 
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are most commonly employed.  First,  net worth may be computed according to 
GAAP net worth,  This measure is useful for standard auditing purposes. 
Second,  tangible net worth can be derived by subtracting goodwill from GAAP. 
This measure is often used as an estimate of liquidation value, since goodwill 
is lost in liquidation.  Third,  RAP net worth,  which is useful for judging 
whether thrifts are in conformity with regulatory standards,  can be derived by 
adding GAAP net worth to various items designed to augment thrifts' apparent 
capital positions.  Examples include net-worth certificates,  appraised equity 
capital, income-capital  certificates, accrued net-worth certificates, 
qualifying subordinated debentures,  and qualifying mutual-capital 
certificates. From these three cost measures,  we have selected GAAP net worth 
for this analysis because it best represents a firm's  going-concern  value. 
The exact construction  of GAAP net worth from call report data is discussed in 
the appendix. 
To ensure that thrifts were correctly classified in the sample,  we 
matched all firms not filing a complete series of call reports over the sample 
period against the merger history file and the list of thrift failures 
published by the Office of Thrift Supewision.  Using these two files,  we were 
able to classify all but 10 institutions as failed or merged over the sample 
period.  We then hand-checked  these 10 against various issues of 
Savings Institution  Directory (published by Rand McNally) and were able to 
classify seven as either mergers or failures.  The remaining three thrifts 
(two of which recovered) were found to be in existence, but were reporting 
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Of the 300 thrifts in our sample,  failing firms that were closed by 
regulators account for 25 percent, institutions merged (with or without 
federal assistance) account for 30 percent, and surviving thrifts account for 
32  percent.  Thus,  recovered thrifts represent only 13 percent of the total 
sample.  These firms were not only in existence in December 1989,  but had 
rebuilt their average capital-to-asset  ratios to 5  percent or more.  Because 
the patterns of most variables for failing,  merged, and surviving thrifts are 
similar,  we combine these three groups to form the nonrecovered sample. 
By including merged thrifts in the nonrecovered sample,  we implicitly 
assume that they would not have survived had they remained independent. 
Ideally,  the merged thrifts should be separated into two types:  private 
mergers (which may include firms that would have survived) and supervisory 
mergers (which should be treated as failures).  Unfortunately,  with the 
exception of assisted mergers (classified here as failures), we cannot 
distinguish private mergers from unassisted supervisory  mergers.  Thus, 
including merged firms in the nonrecovered sample may bias us against finding 
differences between the recovered and nonrecovered samples. 
To check the sensitivity of our merged-sample results,  we reran the 
tests after excluding thrifts that disappeared because of a merger.  Overall, 
we found that the results are not sensitive to inclusion of the merged thrifts 
************ 
l2  We extend special thanks to Michael Bradley and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision for providing us with the merger history file and the list of 
thrift failures through the end of 1989. 
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merged sample entered into merger agreements (either voluntarily or under 
supervisory pressure) because their prospects for recovery,  and even survival, 
would have been dim had they remained independent, 
Before presenting our empirical results,  a discussion of our sample 
sizes is in order.  Although 261 firms failed to recover,  we include only 255 
in the first portion of our sample (December 1979 to June 1985) when reporting 
comparisons through time.  This is because six firms failed between December 
1979 and June 1980,  leaving us with only one observation for each.  We treat 
the second subperiod (June 1985 through December 1989) in a similar manner. 
Although 160 of the nonrecovered firms were in existence in June 1985,  we 
include only 158 because two failed before December 1985.  For comparisons 
between groups (recovered versus nonrecovered),  the sample sizes depend on the 
particular semiannual period examined,  since some thrifts failed in each. 
We split the sample period in  June 1985 because in  March of that year 
the FHLBB issued new regulations restricting S&L  growth and investment 
powers -- a policy change that certainly affected thrift behavior in the 
second half of the decade.  In addition, the critical restructuring decisions 
that ultimately determined whether a thrift recovered,  survived,  or failed 
were likely to have been made in the early 1980s.  Therefore,  simply comparing 
thrifts included in the sample at the beginning with those in existence at the 
end could be misleading. 
Table 2  reports average total assets and GAAP net-worth  ratios for 
both subperiods.  One striking feature is that although recovered firms  were, 
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slowly.  During the first subsample,  which is characterized by increased 
investment powers, total assets of successful thrifts grew an average of 28.3 
percent annually,  compared to 37.4  percent for unsuccessful thrifts. During 
the second subperiod,  this trend reversed.  Recovered thrifts grew 7.6 percent 
annually,  while nonrecovered thrifts grew only 4.0  percent. 
Kaufman (1989) reports that the S&L  industry expanded faster than the 
commercial banking industry between 1980 and 1987,  a finding that is 
consistent with the high growth rate we observe for our total sample.  But 
this pattern runs counter to that of most industries,  which typically shrink 
during times of financial stress.  Levy et al. (1988) cite excessive growth as 
an important factor in thrift failure,  suggesting that the 37.4 percent growth 
rate of nonrecovered firms in our first subsample may have played a 
significant role in these institutions' demise. 
The differences in the average GAAP net worth to total asset ratios 
are impossible to ignore.  Initially,  both recovered and nonrecovered firms 
had similar capital levels (as well as similar retained earnings and paid-in 
surplus).  However, in both subsamples,  nonrecovered thrifts experienced 
continuous earnings problems that eroded their retained earnings and net 
worth.  In contrast,  successful thrifts had higher earnings in both periods 
(especially the second),  and their net-worth  ratios were boosted by 
substantially larger capital infusions,  reflected in paid-in  surplus. 
As shown in table 3,  we find no evidence that the asset structures of 
recovered and nonrecovered thrifts differed significantly in December 1979. 
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Traditionally, thrifts made mortgage loans that matured in 30  years.  But in 
the early 1980s,  legislation  was adopted that allowed these institutions to 
make commercial and consumer loans as well as traditional mortgage loans. 
Both commercial and consumer loans typically mature much quicker than 
traditional mortgages and afford thrifts the opportunity to spread their 
assets among a wider range of investments.  Given these new powers, one would 
expect to find a shift in asset structure from traditional mortgage loans to 
nonmortgage investments. 
Table 3 shows that this expected shift was under way by the mid-1980s. 
Importantly,  the asset structure of nonrecovered firms diverged from that of 
recovered thrifts over time,  with nonrecovered thrifts holding more risky 
assets.  Holdings of nonresidential loans, land loans,  service corporation 
investments,  and junk bonds by nonrecovered thrifts were significantly higher 
than for their successful counterparts,  while holdings of other assets 
(mortgage,  commercial,  and consumer loans) did not differ significantly across 
groups.  l3  By June 1985,  the single-  family mortgage investments of both 
types of thrifts had been significantly reduced,  whereas investment in 
commercial loans,  consumer loans,  and mortgage-backed  securities had risen. 
However, the increase in commercial and consumer loans for successful firms 
was not statistically significant. 
In  the second subsample,  the proportion of total assets in 
************ 
l3  For evidence that these activities are riskier than traditional mortgage 
lending,  see Brewer (1990). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsingle-family  mortgages continued to decline,  as both groups of thrifts 
invested more heavily in mortgage-backed  securities;  however,  no other 
substantial investment changes were evident over time.  This does not mean 
that thrifts collectively opted to hold safer portfolios.  In fact,  the drift 
toward riskier investments continued:  Nonrecovered institutions held more 
junk  bonds and invested more in service corporations in December 1989 than in 
June 1985.  Importantly,  the unsuccessful firms' riskier portfolios did not 
yield significantly  more total income than the safer portfolios of the 
recovered firms. 
Table 4  shows that the liability structures of both recovered and 
nonrecovered thrifts were largely the same in December 1979.  Foreclosed 
assets for nonrecovered thrifts were statistically larger than for recovered 
thrifts.  However, the difference is not important economically. 
Increases in FHLBB advances in the mid-1980s  are significant both 
statistically and economically for nonrecovered thrifts, signaling the 
deteriorating financial condition of these firms.  However, this finding also 
indicates that nonrecovered thrifts were utilizing an important government 
subsidy.  Firms that are members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system 
are afforded the privilege of borrowing from their district FHLB.  These 
borrowings provide liquidity and a subsidized source of funds. 
During the first subsample,  recovered thrifts shifted from higher-risk 
wholesale deposits to retail deposits more than did failed thrifts.  In  June 
1985,  retail deposits of recovered firms accounted for 75 percent of total 
assets,  while for nonrecovered firms the corresponding figure was only 54 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpercent,  Successful firms' reorientation toward a retail focus is also 
reflected in their diminishing reliance on brokered deposits.  Although the 
flow of brokered deposits to successful firms had grown slightly by the 
mid-1980s,  it had increased substantially for nonrecovered thrifts.  14 
Clearly,  recovered firms used the funding flexibility afforded 
depository institutions  by DIDMCA and the Garn-St Germain Act (1982) more 
successfully than nonrecovered thrifts.  The difference in the two groups' 
funding strategies reflected on their 1985 balance sheets suggests that while 
both types of institutions grew during the first  half of the decade, the 
recovered thrifts pursued more conservative growth strategies than their 
unsuccessful counterparts.  Recovered thrifts pursued a core-deposit  growth 
strategy by expanding their assets at a rate they could primarily fund with 
inexpensive retail deposits.  Therefore,  the asset growth of recovered thrifts 
is consistent with the natural market growth associated with successful firms. 
Nonrecovered firms' continued reliance on large, interest-sensitive 
wholesale deposits and nondeposit liabilities indicates a more speculative 
pattern of growth.  Although these institutions used the new funding 
flexibility to increase their retail deposits,  they expanded their asset 
portfolios even faster.  This suggests that nonrecovered thrifts pursued a 
speculative growth strategy,  since it is likely that the retail-deposit  growth 
l4  Brokered deposits are similar to wholesale deposits in that they are 
raised in regional and national money markets and thus tend to be a volatile 
and interest-sensitive source of funds.  Unlike wholesale deposits,  which 
thrifts raise directly,  brokered deposits are placed in thrifts by a money 
broker,  who divides the deposits into pieces small enough to be fully insured. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmrate is closely linked to the growth rate of income,  which in turn is linked 
to the growth rate of the economy. 
The FHLBB attempted to stop the flow of brokered deposits during the 
second portion of our sample,  a policy that Kaufman (1989) claims was a 
mistake.  Because insolvent institutions pursuing high-risk  strategies must 
pay higher rates to attract deposits, the FHLBB,  he argues,  could have used 
the rates thrifts were willing to pay for these deposits as a guide for 
identifying troubled institutions.  Our evidence supports Kaufman's 
contention,  especially during the second subperiod.  Thrifts in the 
nonrecovered sample held nearly five times as many brokered deposits per 
dollar of assets as the recovered thrifts over this period, and their reliance 
on brokered deposits more than doubled. 
The differences  between the second and third columns of table 4 
are worth noting for nonrecovered thrifts.  The second column includes 255 
firms:  103 that failed or merged prior to June 1985 (less six that 
failed/merged before June 1980),  62 that failed/merged between June 1985 and 
December 1989,  and 96 that continued to operate but had not rebuilt their 
capital ratios to 5 percent of total assets.  The third column includes only 
156 firms:  the 62 that failed/merged between June 1985 and December 1989 
(less two that disappeared before December 1985) and the 96 that survived but 
did not recover.  In  brief, the third column contains a lower proportion of 
exceedingly weak firms.  During the sample period, thrift regulators 
incorporated funding mix and asset composition into their closure rules. 
Nonrecovered thrifts whose restructuring strategies differed most from the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsuccessful samples were more likely to be shut down by thrift regulators. 
Therefore, it is reasonable for this column to more nearly approximate the 
values of the 39 successful thrifts.  This is indeed the case.  For example, 
retail deposits for nonrecovered thrifts are only 53.5 percent of total assets 
in column 2,  while in column 3,  that figure rises to 72.4  percent -- quite 
close to the 74.7  percent figure obtained for recovered thrifts.  15 
Interestingly,  while nonrecovered thrifts spent more for advertising 
than recovered firms during the first sample period, the opposite was true 
during the second period.  The difference is not statistically significant, 
however  . 
Benston (1985),  among others,  reports that fraud is often an important 
determinant of thrift failure.  Although we cannot measure fraud directly with 
our data,  we are able to study a related factor:  perquisite consumption. 
Table 5 includes three proxies for perk consumption -- directors' fees,  office 
expenses, and travel expenses -- and reports that no significant differences 
occurred across recovered and nonrecovered firms.  Although fraud may well 
have been important in individual thrift failures,  our evidence lends little 
support to the hypothesis that overconsumption of perks was an important 
factor in the industry's demise.  Instead,  failed thrifts' poor performance 
may have been due to bad business judgment,  bad luck,  or both. 
l5  Thomson (1987a) finds that the value of forbearance embedded in thrifts' 
stock-market  values is a function  of the funding mix and the diversification 
of the asset portfolio. 
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To investigate the robustness of the univariate analysis presented in 
tables 2 to 5,  we perform discriminant analysis to select variables that 
distinguish recovered from nonrecovered thrifts in December 1979,  June 1985, 
and December 1989.  Similar results are obtained. 
As is typically the case in economics and finance studies,  the 
hypothesis tests presented here represent tests of joint hypotheses.  That is, 
our univariate tests are really an examination of 1) the null hypothesis that 
capital-deficient  thrifts which recovered pursued a different operating 
strategy during the 1980s than those which did not and 2) the maintained 
hypothesis that both groups of thrifts were essentially the same in December 
1979.  Without testing the maintained hypothesis, our univariate tests cannot 
accept the null hypothesis; they can only fail to accept the alternative 
hypothesis. 
To test this ancillary hypothesis,  we performed a number of logit 
regression experiments to determine whether we could statistically 
discriminate between the two samples in December 1979.  Variables for these 
regressions  were chosen in three different ways.  First, we constructed 
variables shown to be significant predictors of thrift failure.  Second,  we 
used stepwise discriminant analysis to select regressors from the variables 
used in this study and in Cole et al. (1991)  .I6  Finally,  we employed factor 
************ 
l6  We performed stepwise discriminant analysis using stepwise, forward,  and 
backward elimination.  Stepwise and forward selection indicated one logit 
footnote continues next page 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmanalysis to construct factor loadings from the combined set of variables used 
here and in Cole et al.  Logit analysis was then performed using these factor 
loadings as regressors. 
Regardless of the model specification, logit analysis was unable to 
discriminate  between successful and unsuccessful thrifts, indicating a 
significant group overlap between the two samples.  Thus,  we cannot reject the 
maintained hypothesis that the capital-deficient  thrift samples were 
relatively homogeneous in 1979. 
Our inability to statistically distinguish  between recovered and 
nonrecovered thrifts at the beginning of the sample period calls into question 
the wisdom of capital forbearance  polices.  It is doubtful that policymakers 
could have predicted which thrifts would use their additional time and powers 
to recover and which would optimally choose to maximize the value of their 
deposit guarantees by pursuing high-risk strategies.  This implies that the 
adoption of capital forbearance policies in the early 1980s was at best a 
long-shot bet that exposed taxpayers to enormous financial risk. 
continued footnote 
regression specification,  while backward elimination suggested another. 
However,  neither specification proved capable of discriminating between 
successful and unsuccessful thrifts in December 1979. 
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Unexpected increases in interest rates during the early 1980s and 
decreases in asset quality in the late 1980s caused massive losses throughout 
the S&L  industry.  Insolvency was common, if not the rule.  But because of 
bureaucratic forbearance,  funding constraints, and federal deposit insurance, 
hundreds of insolvent thrifts continued to operate.  These factors,  coupled 
with the expanded investment and lending powers granted to the industry in the 
early 1980s,  gave thrift managers the opportunity to restructure their firms 
and to regain  profitability and solvency. 
The model in Buser et al. (1981) suggests that the combination  of 
expanded powers, flat-rate  deposit insurance,  and lower capital requirements 
implied the need for more effective monitoring.  But in fact,  the number of 
examiners was reduced as the potential for abuse was increased.  Furthermore, 
regulators left intact the incentives for thrifts to take risks.  As a result, 
it is not surprising that the condition of the industry does not appear to 
have improved. 
Most thrifts in our sample shifted away from traditional mortgage 
assets between December 1979 and December 1989.  Only 13 percent of the 
300 thrifts studied both survived and rebuilt their capital ratios to the 5 
percent regulatory minimum in effect at the beginning of the sample period. 
We found that these thrifts held less-risky  portfolios than their unsuccessful 
counterparts.  Overall, our empirical tests support the null hypothesis that 
the successful thrifts pursued a different restructuring strategy than those 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthat failed. 
Finally,  because there was little difference between the initial asset 
and liability structures of thrifts that were ultimately successful and those 
that were not, it is unlikely that regulators would have been able to predict 
in December 1979 which of the firms in our sample would eventually recover. 
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Perhaps surprisingly,  GAAP net worth is generally not reported in the 
call reports.  Because the data are collected for regulatory purposes,  RAP 
values are used instead.  We are able to compute GAAP net worth for the years 
in which data are unavailable, however,  by using the following procedures: 
Prior to June 30, 1981:  "Total net worth" minus deferred 
losses on securities sold and accounts receivable secured by 
pledged savings. 
For December 31,  1981:  "Total net worth" minus qualify- 
ing mutual-capital  certificates minus deferred losses on 
securities sold and accounts receivable secured by pledged 
savings. 
For June 30,  1982:  Same as for December 31,  1981,  although 
the call report variable number for qualifying mutual-capital 
certificates is different. 
For 1983:  RAP net worth minus the sum of qualifying mutual- 
capital, income-capital,  and net-worth  certificates,  qualifying 
subordinated debentures, appraised equity capital,  deferred 
losses on loans sold,  and accounts receivable secured by pledged 
savings  . 
For March 31,  1984 to December 31,  1986:  The sum of preferred 
stock,  permanent reserve or common stock,  capital contributions, 
and undivided profits, less the sum of deferred net losses 
(gains) on loans sold,  deferred net losses (gains) on other 
assets sold,  and accounts receivable secured by pledged savings, 
plus the sum of reserves for contingencies and other capital 
reserves,  plus net retained earnings. 
For March 31,  1987 through December 31,  1988:  Perpetual 
preferred stock plus the sum of permanent reserve or 
common stock,  capital contributions,  and undivided profits, 
less the sum of deferred net losses (gains) on loans sold, 
deferred net losses (gains) on other assets sold,  and accounts 
receivable secured by pledged savings. 
For 1989:  GAAP net worth is reported directly on the 
call reports. 
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www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 1:  Time profile of the sample 
Failures and  mergers of the 300  largest FSLIC-insured  S&Ls and 
mutual savings banks with capital ratios of less than 5 percent on 
December 31, 1979. Sample period is December 31, 1979 to December 
31, 1989.  Data are taken from the FHLBB call reports. 
Nunber  of  Fai Lures/Mergers  Remaining Fims 
Source:  Authors. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2:  Summary statistics of asset and net-worth structure 
Includes the 300 largest thrifts with GAAP  net worth/total  asset 
ratios of less than  5 percent  in  1979.  Recovered  thrifts are 
defined as those that survive the entire sample period  (December 
31, 1979 through December 31, 1989) and have GAAP  net worth/total 
asset ratios in excess of 5 percent in 1989.  Nonrecovered thrifts 
are defined as those that either do not survive the entire sample 
period or have GAAP  net worth/total  asset ratios of less than 5 
percent in 1989.  The data are taken from the FHLBB call reports. 
All numbers are reported by first subsample (December  1979 to  June 
1985)  and  second  subsample  (June 1985 to December  1989).  All 
variables except total assets and growth rates are scaled by total 
assets. If a variable is not reported on the call reports or cannot 
be constructed for a given period, that item is denoted by -. 
Layout of the data is as follows: 
First  subsample:  Data  in the column headed  12/1979  pertain  to 
those firms surviving on December 1979.  Data in the column headed 
6/1985 are the latest data available through June 1985 for those 
firms.  Sample sizes are 39 for the recovered firms and 255 and for 
the nonrecovered firms. 
Second subsample:  Data  in the column headed  6/1985 pertain  to 
those firms surviving on June 1985.  Data  in  the column headed 
12/1989  are the latest data available through December 1989 for 
those firms.  Sample sizes are 39 for the recovered firms and 156 
for the nonrecovered firms. 
First subsample  Second  sobsanple 
Total  Assets  643.787  1175.931#  1175.931  1585.860 
Annual  Growth  0.283  0.283  0.07W 
Recovered  GAAP  Net Worth  0.044  0.034  0.034  0.067## 
Thrifts  Retain Earning  0.013  0.007#  0.007  0.035## 
Paid-insurplus  0.000  0.015#  0.015  0.03W 
Total  Asset  542.490  1173.702##  1554.864  1966.014 
Annual  Growth  0.374  0.528**  0.04W 
Non- 
recovered  GAAP  Net  Worth  0.041  O.OW*  O.OOP*  - .033##** 
Thrifts  Retain Earning  0.010  -.002##**  0.002**  - .042##** 
Paid-insurplus  0.001  0.005##**  0.006**  0.014##** 
##  or **:  Significant  at the  1 percent  level. 
#  or *:  Significant  at the 5 percent  level. 
#  and ##  measure  the significance  level of  the difference between variables  at the end  versus 
the beginning of  the subperiods. 
and ** measure the significance  level of  the difference between variables across  recovered 
thrifts and non~recovered  thrifts in s given pcriod. 
Source:  Authors. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3:  Mortgage and nomortgage investment 
Includes the 300  largest thrifts with  GAAP  net worth/total  asset 
ratios of  less  than  5  percent  in  1979.  Recovered  thrifts are 
defined as those that survive the entire sample period  (December 
31,  1979 through December  31,  1989) and  have  GAAP net worth/total 
asset ratios in excess of  5 percent in 1989.  Nonrecovered  thrifts 
are defined as those that either do  not survive the entire sample 
period  or have  GAAP  net worth/total  asset ratios of  less than  5 
percent in 1989.  The  data are taken  from  the FHLBB  call reports. 
All  numbers are reported by  first subsample  (December  1979 to June 
1985)  and  second  subsample  (June  1985  to December  1989).  All 
variables except total assets and growth rates are scaled by  total 
assets. If a variable is not reported on  the call reports or cannot 
be  constructed for a given period,  that item is denoted by -. 
Layout  of  the data is as follows: 
First subsample:  Data  in the column  headed  12/1979  pertain  to 
those firms surviving on  December  1979.  Data  in the column headed 
6/1985  are the latest data available through June 1985  for those 
firms.  Sample sizes are 39 for the recovered firms and 255 and  for 
the nonrecovered  firms. 
Second subsample:  Data  in the column  headed  6/1985  pertain  to 
those  firms  surviving  on  June  1985.  Data  in the column  headed 
12/1989  are the latest data available through  December  1989  for 
those firms.  Sample sizes are 39  for the recovered  firms and  156 
for the nonrecovered  firms. 
First subsample  Second  subsanple 
Mortgage Loans 
Single Family  0.675  0.490##  0.490  0.470 
~ultiple  Family  0.058  0.064  0.064  0.061 
Nonresidential  0.067  0.067  0.067  0.067 
Land  Loans  0.007  0.010  0.010  0.015 
Mortgage-Backed  0.038  0.116##  0.116  0.143 
Securities 
Recovered 
Thrifts  Wonmortgage  Loans 
~omne;cial  Loans  0.004  0.017  0.017  0.013 
Conswr Loans  0.025  0.033  0.033  0.048 
Other  Risky Investments 
Real  Estate  0.002  0.002  0.002.  0.002 
Service Corp.  0.005  0.010#  0.010  0.011 
Junk  Bonds  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Total  Income  0.045  0.054##  0.054  0.050## 
Mortgage Loans 
Single Family  0.659  0.512##  0.466  0.417## 
Multiple Family  0.055  0.056  0.060  0.056 
Nonresidential  0.073  0.089W  0.098*  0.100" 
Land  Loans  0.008  0.021W*  0.028**  0.019# 
Mortgage-Backed  0.051  0.107##  0.102  0.149## 
Won-  Securities 
Recovered 
Thrifts  Wonmortgage  Loans 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmComnercial  Loans  0.007  0.013##  0.014  0.018 
Consuner  Loans  0.026  0.034##  0.042  0.047 
Other  Risky  Investments 
Real Estate  0.001  0.00W  0.004  0.004 
Service Corp  0.005  0.014##  0.017.  0.020' 
Junk  Bonds  0.003**  0.003"  0.005** 
Total  Income  0.045  0.054##  0.056  0.W 
##  or **:  Significant at the  1 percent  Level. 
#  or *:  Significant at the 5 percent  level. 
#  and ##  measure  the significance  Level  of the difference between variables  at the end versus 
the beginning of the subperiods. 
* and ** measure  the significance  Level  of the difference between variables  across  recovered 
thrifts and nonrecovered thrifts in  a given period. 
Source:  Authors. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4:  Liabilities, bad loans, and advertisement expenses 
Includes the 300  largest thrifts with  GAAP  net worth/total  asset 
ratios of  less  than  5  percent  in 1979.  Recovered  thrifts are 
defined as those that survive the entire sample period  (December 
31,  1979 through December  31,  1989)  and have GAAP  net worth/total 
asset ratios in excess of  5 percent in 1989.  Nonrecovered thrifts 
are defined as those that either do not survive the entire sample 
period or have  GAAP  net worth/total  asset ratios of  less than 5 
percent in 1989.  The  data are taken from the FHLBB  call reports. 
All  numbers  are reported by first subsample  (December  1979 to  June 
1985)  and  second  subsample  (June  1985  to December  1989).  All 
variables except total assets and growth rates are scaled by total 
assets. If a variable is not reported on the call reports or cannot 
be constructed for a given period,  that item is denoted by -. 
Layout of  the data is as follows: 
First subsample:  Data  in the column  headed  12/1979  pertain  to 
those firms surviving on December  1979.  Data  in the column headed 
6/1985  are the latest data available through June  1985  for those 
firms.  Sample sizes are 39  for the recovered firms and 255 and for 
the nonrecovered  firms. 
Second subsample:  Data in the column  headed  6/1985  pertain to 
those  firms  surviving on  June  1985.  Data  in the column  headed 
12/1989  are the latest data  available through  December  1989  for 
those firms.  Sample sizes are 39  for the recovered firms and 156 
for the nonrecovered  firms. 
Firstsubsanple  Secondsubsanple 
Deposit  Structure 
Retail Deposits  0.218  0.747##  0.747  0.720 
Uholesale Deposits  0.583  0.064##  0.064  0.076 
Brokered Deposits  0.001  0.004  0.004  0.008 
Recovered  FHLBB  Advances  0.084  0.05W  0.059  0.067 
Thrifts 
Bad  Loans 
Slow  Loans  0.009  0.015##  0.015  0.027# 
Foreclosed Assets  0.000  0.005##  0.005  0.010 
Advertisements  0.00063  0.00039##  0.00039  0.00043 
Deposit  Structure 
Retail Deposits  0.196  0.535##** 0.724  0.734 
Uholesale Deposits  0.603  0.265We 0.087  0.073 
Yon-  • Brokered Deposits  0.001  0.014##**  0.018**  0.038##** 
Recovered  FHLBB  Advances  0.089  0.107##**  0.093..  0.10P* 
Thrifts 
Bed  Loans 
Slow  Loans  0.009  0.020##  0.023..  0. MOW* 
Foreclosed Assets  0.001**  0.0W  0.008.  0.037##** 
Advertisements  0.00062  0.00050##** 0.00044  0.00033 
##  or **:  Significant  at the  1 percent  Level. 
#  or *:  Significant  at the 5 percent  Level. 
#  and  ##  measure  the significance Level  of  the difference between variables  at the end versus 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe beginning  of  the subperiods. 
and ** measure  the significance  Level  of  the difference between variables across  recovered 
thrifts and  nonrecovered  thrifts in a  given period. 
Source:  Authors. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5:  Perk consumption 
Includes the 300 largest thrifts with GAAP net worth/total  asset 
ratios of less than 5 percent  in  1979.  Recovered  thrifts are 
defined as those that survive the entire sample period  (December 
31, 1979 through December 31, 1989) and have GAAP net worth/total 
asset ratios in excess of 5 percent in 1989.  Nonrecovered thrifts 
are defined as those that either do not survive the entire sample 
period or have GAAP net worth/total  asset ratios of less than 5 
percent in 1989.  The data are taken from the FHLBB call reports. 
All numbers are reported by first subsample (December  1979 to  June 
1985) and  second subsample  (June 1985 to December  1989).  All 
variables except total assets and growth rates are scaled by total 
assets. If a variable is not reported on the call reports or cannot 
be constructed for a given period, that item is denoted by -. 
Layout of the data is as follows: 
First subsample:  Data  in the column headed  12/1979  pertain to 
those firms surviving on December 1979.  Data in the column headed 
6/1985 are the latest data available through June 1985 for those 
firms.  Sample sizes are 39 for the recovered firms and 255 and for 
the nonrecovered firms. 
Second  subsample:  Data  in the column headed  6/1985  pertain to 
those firms surviving on June 1985.  Data  in the column headed 
12/1989  are the latest data available through December 1989 for 
those firms.  Sample sizes are 39 for the recovered firms and 156 
for the nonrecovered firms. 
First subsanple  Second subsanple 
Perk  Consunption 
Directors'  Fees  0.00007  0.00006  0.00006  0.00008 
Recovered  Travel  Expenses  0.00011  0.00016  0.00016  0.00011 
Thrifts  Office Expenses  0.00062  0.00086##  0.00086  0.00106# 
Perk  Consunption 
Non-  Directors' Fees  0.00008  0.00006  0.00006  0.00006 
Recovered  Travel  Expenses  0.00010  0.00008  0.00009  0.00009 
Thrifts  Office Expenses  0.00064  0.00089##  0.000%  0.0011W 
##  or **:  Significant  at the  1  percent  Level. 
#  or *:  Significant  at the 5  percent  level. 
#  and ##  measure  the significance  Level  of  the difference between variables at the end  versus 
the beginning of  the subperiods. 
and ** measure  the significance  Level  of  the difference between variables  across  recovered 
thrifts and  nonrecovered  thrifts in a  given period. 
Source:  Authors. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm